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ABSTRACT
Researchers studying computer networks rely on the availability of traffic trace data collected from live production
networks. Those choosing to share trace data with colleagues must first remove or otherwise anonymize sensitive
information. This process, called sanitization, represents a
tradeoff between the removal of information in the interest
of identity protection and the preservation of data within
the trace that is most relevant to researchers. While several metrics exist to quantify this privacy-utility tradeoff,
they are often computationally expensive. Computing these
metrics using a sample of the trace, rather than the entire
input trace, could potentially save precious time and space
resources, provided the accuracy of these values does not
suffer.
In this paper, we examine several simple sampling methods to discover their effects on measurement of the privacyutility tradeoff when anonymizing network traces prior to
their sharing or publication. After sanitizing a small sample trace collected from the Dartmouth College wireless network, we tested the relative accuracy of a variety of previouslyimplemented packet and flow-sampling methods on a few
existing privacy and utility metrics. This analysis led us to
conclude that, for our test trace, no single sampling method
we examined allowed us to accurately measure the tradeoff, and that some sampling methods can produce grossly
inaccurate estimates of those values. We were unable to
draw conclusions on the use of packet versus flow sampling
in these instances.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Computer-network researchers depend on the availability
of traffic trace data collected from live production networks.
It is often difficult to obtain this type of data, however, which
aid in the solving of problems related to the structure and
usage of real-world networks. These difficulties are caused in
no small part by the imposing infrastructure requirements
and the need to obtain appropriate permissions to collect
trace data. Due to this scarcity of data, it becomes extremely important for the community of network researchers
to share available traces amongst several research projects;
this has resulted in the creation of data archive resources
such as CRAWDAD [10].
Those that choose to share trace data with their colleagues encounter the additional burden to remove or otherwise anonymize sensitive information (e.g., identities of network users or network topology). Identifying and properly
removing this information is often a daunting and complex
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task, one that may deter researchers from releasing their collected trace data. It is particularly difficult to identify the
types of data that are sensitive in network traces, leading to
the increased possibility of sensitive information remaining
within a trace thought to be properly sanitized.
Sanitization, by nature, represents a tradeoff between the
removal of information to fulfill privacy requirements and
the preservation of information that may be useful in later
analysis. To streamline the process of trace sanitization
and to better analyze this tradeoff, we proposed the NetSANI (Network Trace Sanitization and ANonymization Infrastructure) framework and API [14]. Using either existing
or user-defined metrics, the framework is designed to allow
the researcher to analyze an anonymized trace to determine
whether it meets prespecified privacy and utility goals. In
computing the metrics, NetSANI works with a sample of
the collected trace with the goal of saving precious time and
resources when developing an anonymization scheme.
Trace sampling is hardly a new concept; the benefits and
accuracy of various sampling techniques have been analyzed
with respect to anomaly detection [1, 2, 23, 24], computation
of traffic flow statistics [5, 7, 12], network management [15],
and sample space efficiency [32]. However, little or no attention has been paid to the effects of sampling when analyzing
anonymized network traces.
In this thesis, we apply several well-known sampling methods to network traces and analyze their effect on some existing privacy and utility metrics. By comparing these results
to the same analysis on the unsampled traces, we seek to
discover which sampling methods produce the most accurate estimates of the tradeoff between privacy and utility
and examine any trends in the experiments. These results
can then be used to benefit NetSANI, by either the identification of globally-effective sampling methods or the discovery of specific sampling methods that benefit a specific trace
analysis; the end goal is to allow researchers to quickly identify an appropriate anonymization strategy for their network
traces.
In Sections 2 and 3, we summarize some established networktrace sampling methods and metrics to compute privacy and
utility, respectively. Then, in Section 4, we test a few of these
sampling methods on an anonymized TCP/IP network trace
to determine their effect on analyses of the privacy/utility
tradeoff on that trace. We discuss the results of these experiments in Section 5 and how they may aid a researcher
to develop an adequate anonymization strategy. Finally, we
discuss related and future work in Section 6 and conclude in
Section 7.
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Figure 1: Examples of (a) periodic (1-of-n) sampling
and (b) random sampling.

2.

SAMPLING METHODS

In this section, we introduce several methods used to sample or otherwise filter data. Because this thesis is concerned
about the effects of these sampling methods on network
traces in particular, we choose to group these methods into
two somewhat broad categories: those that operate by examining individual packets or records (record-based ), and those
that operate on network flows (flow-based ). The latter apply
only to packet traces, whereas the former may also apply to
other trace forms (such as network access-point association
logs).
Each of the sampling methods here behaves according to
fixed predefined rules for the entire sampling process; therefore, they are considered examples of conventional sampling.
Conversely, methods that are more complex and change behavior based on already seen data are considered adaptive
sampling [15].

2.1

Basic record-based sampling

The simplest of sampling methods, periodic sampling (also
known as deterministic or 1-of-n sampling), functions by
choosing every nth record in the original trace [7, 15]. Applying a probability distribution to the records results in a
variant method, random sampling. Each record processed
then has a probability 1/n of being included in the sample;
depending on the distribution function (such as uniform or
Poisson distributions), the number of records present in a
sample may vary run-to-run. Figure 1 shows basic examples
of periodic and random sampling.
Brauckhoff et al. [2] demonstrated that periodic sampling
of packets preserved the ability to accurately estimate packet
statistics, such as total packet count and average packet size.
Additionally, changes in the distribution of packet fields over
time – also called feature entropy – were also reasonably
well-preserved in the sampled trace even at high values of
n. Preservation of feature entropy is especially useful, as
variances in the entropies of specific fields have been used to
detect network anomalies such as DoS and portscans [20].
Unfortunately, periodic sampling was also shown to significantly degrade the ability to accurately estimate similar
statistics for flows contained within the trace, producing
“grossly inaccurate” results even at low values of n [2, 32].

2.2

Stratified record-based sampling

Stratified sampling attempts to improve on the methods
discussed in Section 2.1 by first using predetermined rules
to sort and separate records into mutually-exclusive groups,
or strata. Individual strata are then sampled separately,
often by periodic or random sampling as described above.
For example, Hernandez et al. [15] separated records into
fixed time-duration strata prior to sampling a single record
at random in each interval; this basic example of stratified

Dartmouth TR2011-697

2T

3T

4T

Figure 2: Example of stratified sampling, as shown
by Hernandez et al. [15]. Upon dividing the trace
into fixed-time strata, each strata was then independently sampled to choose one of its records at
random.
sampling is illustrated in Figure 2.

2.3

Flow-based sampling

A network flow (also known as a traffic flow ) is an artificial construct analogous to a physical phone connection or
call, officially defined in RFC 2722 as “a portion of traffic,
delimited by a start and stop time, that belongs to [a network entity]” [3]. The NetFlow protocol developed by Cisco
Systems defines by default a flow as a connection that either
terminates according to TCP protocol, or has seen no new
traffic in one minute [23].
The sampling of complete flows, or flow sampling, is an
alternative to record-based sampling, albeit one with a large
penalty in performance and space requirements, that allows
for more accurate estimates of unsampled flow statistics [1,
16]. Methods used to sample flows are similar to their
record-based counterparts once the flows present within the
packet trace are identified.
Periodic and uniform random sampling of flows has been
shown to have a bias towards larger, so-called “heavy-hitter”
or “elephant” flows [16]. Specific flow-sampling algorithms
have been developed that attempt to correct (or take advantage of) this bias and to address the high resource requirements. In this section, we summarize a few of those
methods.

2.3.1

Opportunistic flow sampling

Androulidakis et al. [1] describe the concept of opportunistic sampling, in which the sampling algorithm specifically
targets either larger or smaller flows to “[magnify] the appearance of anomalies within the sampled data set”, especially when an anomaly may be detected by outlying traffic.
The targeting of large flows is called smart sampling and the
targeting of small flows is called selective sampling.
Smart sampling. Smart sampling [1, 23] dictates that for
each flow F of size Fx bytes, the probability p(F ) that flow
F is selected in the sample is dictated by the expression in
Equation 1, where z is a threshold flow size to reduce space
requirements:

p(F ) =

Fx /z
1

x<z
x≥z

(1)

Flows larger than the threshold are always chosen for
the sample, whereas flows smaller than the threshold are
sampled with probability proportional to their size. Mai et
al. [23] analyzed smart sampling with respect to portscan detection, which relies on the presence of small flows to detect
possible anomalies; predictably, smart sampling performed
poorly in this instance.

2

Selective sampling. Unlike smart sampling, selective sampling takes the opposite approach, targeting smaller flows
that may be responsible for attacks such as DDoS, portscans,
and worm propogations. Selective sampling [1] is defined in
Equation 2, where c is a constant probability 0 < c < 1 that
a flow may be selected, z is a packets-per-flow threshold,
and n ≥ 1 is a parameter designed to allow further control
of the number of “heavy-hitting” flows in the sample:

c
x≤z
p(F ) =
(2)
z
n · Fx x > z
Under certain circumstances, selective sampling was shown
to improve detection of anomalies, especially those that depend on the presence of small flows; Androulidakis et al.
found “anomalies that would otherwise be untraceable” [1].

2.3.2

Hybrid methods

Many have attempted, with mixed results, to combine the
estimation accuracy benefits of flow-based sampling methods with the performance advantages of record-based sampling methods.
An example of a hybrid approach is seen in the sampleand-hold (S&H) method [13], in which a flow table F is
maintained during the parsing of records from a network
trace T . Each packet Ti , part of a flow FTi , is treated as
follows:
• if the corresponding flow is in the table, that is, FTi ∈
F , add Ti to the sample set;
• otherwise, sample the record with a probability p proportional to its size. If packet Ti is selected for addition
to the sample set, also add FTi to F at this time.
Despite the potential benefits to this middle-of-the-road
approach, Mai et al. showed that the performance of S&H
was inferior to all other methods described above when smallsized flows are desired in the sample [23]. In addition, by
definition, S&H may miss the beginnings of several flows,
and fail to recognize the termination of a flow. Therefore,
we did not implement this method in our experiments but
mention it here for completeness.

2.4

Adaptive and “fair” methods

Adaptive sampling methods, those that dynamically change
the sampling rate based on prior traffic, have also been
proposed primarily for their benefits during live collection
of data and passive traffic measurement, rather than postcapture analysis; therefore, we only briefly mention them
here. Those performing passive traffic analysis are confronted with several challenges, including the limited memory resources at collection points (routers) and the increasing amount of network traffic given increased link capacity
and speeds.
When collecting trace data, it is also of interest to use
these resources to produce the “fairest” trace possible. Because the conventional sampling methods described above
tend to produce samples biased towards “heavy-hitting” flows,
“fair” in this context means determining methods to correct
this bias [17, 26], often at the expense of simplicity. To
make “fair” methods more feasible to implement, further efforts have focused on reducing the space complexity required
to perform a fair sampling [32].
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3.

PRIVACY AND UTILITY METRICS

There are two types of metrics used in the analysis of
network traces: privacy metrics, which measure the degree
to which a sanitization method fulfills its predetermined requirements, and utility metrics, which measure the usefulness of data preserved after the sanitization of a trace.

3.1

Privacy metrics

A privacy metric (also known as an anonymity metric),
is defined by Kelly et al. [18] as a quantification of how
well an anonymization strategy hides the identity of sensitive
information or users against a particular attack.
Individual privacy metrics may be sensitive to the underlying types or structure of the dataset to be analyzed or may
be generic enough to apply to a wider range of data formats.
In our work, we classify anonymity metrics into two broad
models: those that are microdata-based and those that are
network-based. Microdata-based metrics assume the dataset
is organized like a relational database in which certain fields
may be designated as “sensitive” a priori; network-based
metrics use statistical and probabilistic information about
the dataset to simulate an adversary’s knowledge. The NetSANI framework [14] is designed to accommodate both models, and our experiments here use examples of both types of
metrics.

3.1.1 k-anonymity
We begin with a well-known and simple microdata-based
metric, k-anonymity [6]. When preparing to release a dataset
that contains fields known to contain “sensitive” information,
we must recognize that the adversary may use some nonsensitive fields in conjunction with externally available information to identify sensitive data; this set of attributes are
called quasi-identifiers [6]. An adversary may have external
information that maps quasi-identifiers to actual identities,
and thus may be able (with the released dataset) to map
identities to sensitive values. The microdata-based metric
of k-anonymity states that for each combination of values
of quasi-identifiers, that combination can be matched to at
least k identities.
The dataset presented in Table 1 is an example of an
anonymized dataset that achieves 2-anonymity with the set
of sensitive attributes S = query. This means that for each
individual record in the dataset, there exist at least 2 instances of a single quasi-identifier Q = ip, date, time that
could be associated with that record’s sensitive value. In
our sample dataset, this means that the sensitive query of
“skin rash” could have originated from at least 2 records with
the quasi-identifier (96.234.68.2*, 2008-10-**, 23**).
k-anonymity is quite limited in its scope, and does not
attempt to measure the variety of sensitive values associated
with each quasi-identifier; for instance, all records within
the quasi-identifier (96.234.69.**, 2008-10-2*, 234*) in the
sample dataset can be associated with the sensitive query
“AIDS medicine”. Additional microdata-type metrics such
as l-diversity and t-closeness attempt to address this and
other shortcomings [18].
We can define k-anonymity as a simple ternary privacy
metric, as shown in Table 2; it measures privacy at three
levels: preserved, degraded, or eliminated. By specifying a
threshold value z, we measure whether the network trace is
k-anonymous such that k ≥ z. If so, then privacy is considered to be preserved; else privacy is considered degraded, or
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IP address
96.234.69.*
96.234.69.*
222.154.155.***
222.154.155.***
96.234.68.2*
96.234.68.2*
96.234.68.2*
96.234.68.2*
129.170.111.1**
129.170.111.1**

Date
2008-10-2*
2008-10-2*
2008-10-**
2008-10-**
2008-10-**
2008-10-**
2008-10-**
2008-10-**
2008-10-2*
2008-10-2*

Time
234*
234*
23**
23**
23**
23**
23**
23**
235*
235*

Query
AIDS medicine
AIDS medicine
m-invariant
l-diversity
cook book
skin rash
filling station
winter coats
tan salon
mcdonalds jobs

Table 1: Sample dataset for a search engine network
log anonymized such that k-anonymity is achieved
for k = 2 [18].

in the case of k = 1, eliminated [18].
Privacy level
Preserved
Degraded
Eliminated

Metric
k
k
k

level = z
≥z
<z
=1

Table 2: k-anonymity privacy metric [18].

3.1.2

L1-similarity

Prior to introducing the next metric, we introduce the
concept of a network object [8, 14]. A network object is
an entity whose identity a trace publisher seeks to protect
and/or retain utility, such as a host, subnet, or web page. It
is important to note that an object may be defined by more
than one record in a trace (multiple packets may be from
the same host); the converse holds, as a record may belong
to one or more network objects (for example, a TCP packet
refers to both the src host and the dst host).
L1-similarity [18] estimates the anonymity of an object by
computing a distance between the distribution of values of
an anonymized object X and the distribution of values of
an unanonymized object Y , defined as
sim(X, Y ) = 2 −

X

|P (X = z) − P (y = z)|.

(3)

z∈X∪Y

The maximum value of sim(X, Y ) is 2, which represents
an identical distribution of features between the two objects.
This notion is somewhat counterintuitive, representing the
maximum preservation of anonymity because an attacker
fails to gain additional knowledge from the anonymized dataset.
Conversely, if the distributions of the two objects are totally
disjoint, the similarity is 0, and the attacker gains “complete
Privacy level
Preserved
Degraded
Eliminated

Metric level = sim(X, Y )
sim(X, Y ) = 2
0 < sim(X, Y ) < 2
sim(X, Y ) ≈ 0

Privacy level
Preserved
Degraded
Eliminated

Metric level = Dr
Dr = 1
0 ≤ Dr < 1
Dr ≈ 0

Table 4: Entropy anonymity degree (EAD) privacy
metric [18].

or substantial knowledge of identities and relationships” [18].
This metric is summarized in Table 3.

3.1.3

Entropy anonymity degree (EAD)

Consider a situation of an adversary attempting to discern
the author of each of several messages sent across a network.
The adversary knows the set of all the possible authors, but
at the onset, it appears equally likely that any author may
have sent a given message. However, upon learning additional information, such as how prolific each author is, the
adversary is able to guess with more certainty which author
may have written a given message. The metric of entropy
anonymity degree uses entropy to measure how much information the adversary has gained, and thus, the degree of
anonymity that the author of a message retains after the
attack [11].
Mathematically, let I be the set of distinct values that are
represented in a probability distribution X; in this case, each
i ∈ I represents an author ai in the set of all possible authors
A. Let pi represent the probability that ai is responsible
for a message. Therefore, pi = P r(X = i), where P r is a
probability mass function.
The entropy of this probability distribution is defined as
follows, where N is the size of the sample space [8, 11]:

H(X) = −

N
X

pi log2 (pi )

(4)

i=1

Entropy anonymity degree (noted Dr ) normalizes the result of H(X) above, dividing it by the maximum entropy
Hmax = log2 N of the system:
Dr =

H(X)
,
Hmax

(5)

where 0 ≤ Dr ≤ 1 [29].
Logically, the maximum degree of anonymity is achieved
when the attacker finds it equally likely that any author is responsible for sending a given message; likewise, anonymity
has been eliminated when the attacker is certain or nearcertain of the author of that message. This may be represented in an anonymity metric as follows (summarized in
Table 4): when Dr = 1, all values across the attribute are
equally likely, and privacy is fully preserved. As Dr decreases, privacy becomes increasingly degraded until, when
Dr = 0, privacy is considered fully eliminated.
Note that the value of EAD, Dr , is specific to the probability mass function P r of the sample space X, which is
dependent on the type of information that the attacker possesses.

Table 3: L1-similarity anonymity metric [18].

Dartmouth TR2011-697

4

3.2

Utility metrics

4.

Quantified measurement of utility is difficult, because those
looking to use trace data (researchers) often have specific use
cases. Therefore, unlike the privacy metrics, developing an
overarching utility metric is a much more challenging endeavor [4]. Almost all metrics to date center on the concept
of anomaly detection as a measure of utility, because often
the search for anomalous traffic (e.g., DoS attack, portscan)
requires a wide range of useful data from the trace. For
example, several important anomalies may be mined from
examining the entropy of traffic features [1, 20]:
• DDoS attack: a distributed denial of service attack
attempts to target a single service, in order to make
a resource unavailable to others; the attack may come
from many sources.
Fields affected: large decrease in H for dst and dstprt.
• Portscan: in a portscan attack, a single sender sends
packets to a host over a wide range of ports, with the
intent to identify services available at the host.
Fields affected: large decrease in H for src, dst, and
srcprt, slight increase in H for dstprt, and slight decrease in H for Fx , the flow size.
• Worm propogation: a program that replicates itself
in an attempt to exploit and infect other machines.
Fields affected: large decrease in H for src and dstprt,
slight increase for dst and srcprt, and slight decrease
in H for Fx .

3.2.1

Snort

While it is possible to implement separate metrics measuring detection of the attacks above, the open-source intrusiondetection tool Snort [28] contains the tools necessary to
determine the type and extent of a wide range of anomalies during either live packet capture or post-capture analysis [21, for example]. Because Snort contains rules designed
to discover instances of all three attacks described above,
we develop a simple metric (Table 5) based on the number
and severity of alerts when running a TCP/UDP network
trace through the intrusion-detection tool; alerts with higher
severity and/or lower frequency are assigned higher utility
value.
Table 5: Snort utility metric: value assigned to alert
by type
Class
No Alert
Truncated header
TCP reset
SNMP request
TCP window close
SNMP trap
ICMP ping
ICMP ping NMAP
ICMP redirect host
ICMP unreachable host/port
SQL ping
TCP portscan
TCP portsweep

Value
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.7
0.9
1.0

Because a trace theoretically has no measurable utility
limit, we compare the values of the utility metric of the raw
trace against the same analysis run on the sanitized trace.
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EVALUATION

In this section, we present the results of our analysis of the
effects of the aforementioned sampling methods on privacy
metrics and Snort utility measurements on a modest-sized
trace.
The trace used for this analysis was collected over a ninehour period on the Dartmouth College campus wireless network in December 2003 and contains 1,651,553 IP packets
with either TCP or UDP headers. It was collected using 18
wireless sniffers located in 14 buildings across campus.

4.1

Trace preparation

Prior to sampling the trace, we used the open-source anontool [19] program to produce a sanitized version of our trace.
Its configuration was as follows:
• IP addresses: prefix-preserving mapping
• Port numbers: one-to-one mapping
• Payload: hashed
The payload of TCP/UDP packets was truncated during
collection of the trace. Thus, anontool calculates the hash
of the remaining payload data, if any exists.
By using this sanitization configuration, the count of packets and flows is consistent between the raw and sanitized
trace, and the distributions of features remain constant,
which allows us to measure the changes incurred upon these
distributions by the sampling methods.

4.2

Sampling configuration

In this subsection, we summarize the implementations of
our sampling methods and the configurations employed, to
produce sampled versions of our raw (pre-sanitization) and
sanitized traces.

4.2.1

Experiment framework and configuration

Packet-based sampling
To perform packet-based sampling on our traces in pcap format, we used a custom Python [27] wrapper for the C library
libpcap [22] to count the number of TCP and UDP packets
contained within the trace and collect field information as
necessary (e.g., src values when performing a stratified sample on that field), performed the selected sampling method
on the input trace, and constructed a new pcap trace containing only the packets selected for the sample.
Flow-based sampling
Using the tool tcptrace [31] on default settings, we first
constructed a list of the distinct connections (flows) present
within our packet trace, and determined the total number of
TCP and UDP connections in the trace. With the detailed
output from tcptrace, we were then able to collect the appropriate data needed about the trace (e.g., each flow’s size
in bytes, for smart sampling) – using this data, we wrote a
Python program to perform the selected sampling method
on the trace. Given the set of flows to be included in the
sample, we again used tcptrace to filter the trace and determine the packets belonging to those flows; as before, we
then constructed a new pcap trace containing the packets
selected for the sample.
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4.2.2

Method parameters

For this analysis, we implemented deterministic and uniform random packet sampling, stratified packet sampling,
deterministic and uniform random flow sampling, smart sampling, and selective sampling. Their configuration parameters in our experiments are described in Table 6.
Table 6: Parameter configurations for sampling
methods used in analyses.
Packet

Deterministic
Uniform random

n = 1, 51, 111, ..., 961
p = 1/1, 51, 111, ..., 961

Stratified
(Deterministic)

field= src
n = 1, 51, 111, ..., 961
field= srcprt
n = 1, 51, 111, ..., 961

Flow

Deterministic
Uniform random
Smart

n = 1, 51, 111, ..., 961
p = 1/1, 51, 111, ..., 961
z = 3, 503, 1003, ..., 9503

Selective

c = 0.03
n = 1, 100, 1000, 10000
z = 6, 8, 10, ..., 98

We chose parameters so that trends in privacy or utility
measurements could be best distinguished, with a secondary
goal that the sample trace sizes are roughly comparable between sampling methods. While deterministic and random
sampling can decrease the sample size (e.g., by increasing n
or decreasing p) until the size of the sample is 0, the opportunistic sampling methods’ sample size converges towards a
non-zero value, making direct comparison difficult between
individual traces produced by differing sampling methods.

4.3

Metric configuration

In this subsection, we briefly describe the specific implementations of the metrics described in Section 3.

4.3.1 k-anonymity
When calculating k-anonymity of the trace, we consider
one feature to be “sensitive” and the others to be quasiidentifiers, leading to four cases:
Sensitive Field
src
dst
srcprt
dstprt

4.3.2

Quasi-identifiers
{dst, srcprt, dstprt}
{src, srcprt, dstprt}
{src, dst, dstprt}
{src, dst, srcprt}

L1-similarity

We defined as a network object an entity called host.
Hosts are unique IP addresses that may appear in the src
or dst fields of a record in a packet trace; in other words, a
host is either a sender or a receiver of data during the time
period in which the trace was collected.
Formally, each host object A consists of records from T
with values on features F = {src, dst, srcprt, dstprt}, such
that A = t ∈ T : (tsrc = h ∨ tdst = h), where h is the
IP address for A. To measure the similarity between two
objects, we first calculate the distributions of distinct values
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on each feature for the records contained within the host
object.
We measured the L1-similarity between an unanonymized
host Ar ∈ AR and an anonymized host As ∈ AS : for each
feature f ∈ F , we compared the distribution of distinct values in Arf and Asf , as in Equation 3. Due to trace sanitization, these distinct values cannot be compared directly (e.g.,
IP address “67.23.134.45” anonymizes to “123.145.167.189”)
and we were thus forced to indirectly compare the distributions. We did this in our analysis by considering the most
frequently occurring value in Asf to represent the most frequently occurring value in Arf , the second most frequently
values in Asf and to Arf to be the same, and so on. As described in Section 3.1.2, the maximum value for sim(Arf , Asf )
is 2, which indicates that the two objects have identical distributions on the feature f , and there is a strong possibility
that Arf = Asf .

4.3.3

Entropy anonymity degree

As mentioned in Section 3.1.3, the probability mass function P r required to calculate EAD is not specified. Therefore, in our analysis, we were required to define our own
mass function.
The mass function we implemented for our experiments
was previously used by Coull et al. [8] as a portion of their
analysis to measure privacy over several iterations of adversary deanonymization. The mass function is defined as
follows:
sim(Arf , Asf )
.
a∈AR ∪AS sim(arf , as,f )

P r(Arf = Asf ) = P

(6)

This definition of the probability mass function assigns
the highest masses where similarity between two objects is
relatively high compared to the total similarity measured between all pairs of objects. For example, let sim(Arx , Asy ) =
1.8; if the average similarity between a raw object and sanitized object is 0.5, P r(Arx , Asy ) would be much higher than
if the average similarity were 1.7.
We then calculated Shannon’s entropy (Equation 4), on
the set of values in P r on each feature to calculate the EAD
at the field level. At the host level, the EAD is the sum of the
field-level entropies; to calculate the normalized EAD, whose
value is between 0 and 1, we divided the field-level EAD and
host-level EAD by log2 |AS | and |F | log2 |AS |, respectively,
as in Equation 5.

4.3.4

Snort

To perform our experiments, we obtained the core Snort
Engine and installed it on our test machine. Because the
Snort intrusion-detection system depends on an updated set
of rules to test traces against, we updated our rules to the
set current as of 2011-04-27.
To collect alert logs, we then ran Snort with these rules on
each input sampled trace, filtering for alerts on IP packets
only but otherwise run on default settings. (Alerts generated by packets with protocols other than TCP or UDP were
present in our log files; we discuss this effect when examining the results of our analyses in Section 4.4.3). After collection, we used a script to further parse and process these logs
to obtain counts of each unique alert type for our sampled
traces.
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4.4

Experiments

In this subsection, we present the results of our experiments on the sample traces generated as described in Section 4.2.

4.4.1

L1-similarity and EAD

The potential resource benefits of sampling are clear upon
examination of our chosen algorithm to calculate L1-similarity
between raw and anonymized objects. Because we compare
each raw object to each anonymized object, use of this metric requires O(n2 ) time and space; reducing the input size,
even by a small amount, would therefore result in tangible
performance gains.
Due to our implementation of the L1-similarity metric as
the core for our EAD metric, we were able to directly examine whether similarity values are altered by the sampling
process, and if so, whether entropy values based on that
metric were also affected.
Calculating these metrics on our original unsampled trace
served as a baseline by which we could compare the accuracy of the same calculations when run on sampled raw and
sanitized traces; these baseline values are located in Table 7.
Note that in this and all other L1-similarity calculations in
our experiments, the value listed represents the average of
the L1-similarity values across all sanitized objects.
Unique hosts
L1-similarity

EAD

src
1.5314
src
0.99530

1679
dst
srcprt
1.4925
0.9112
host: 1.3463
dst
srcprt
0.99513 0.97028
host: 0.98889

dstprt
1.4503
dstprt
0.99486

Table 7: L1-similarity and EAD for unsampled sanitized trace.

These results indicate that, over the 1,679 unique hosts located in the trace file, the average similarity of hosts across
the src and dst objects are roughly the same and that the
distributions of these similarities are also comparable; the
entropy values for both src and dst are approximately 0.995
in the unsampled trace. The srcprt feature, however, features notably less similarity between objects, raising the possibility that a host may be more sensitive to identification
by using external information about the srcprt field – the
lower EAD for the field seems to confirm this. We may,
therefore, consider the srcprt to be the “least private” field
when measuring the anonymity of hosts in our unsampled
trace.
Figure 3 presents the results of our calculations of the
L1-similarity of each feature f ∈ {src, dst, srcprt, dstprt}
and the host object for all samples described in Table 6.
Larger versions of these plots for each feature may be found
in Appendix A.
We chose the number of distinct hosts as our x-axis in
these plots because they reveal a clear trend in similarity
values for all features as the sampled trace size decreases;
L1-similarity measurements become artificially high even at
low sampling rates and then begin to decrease again as the
sample trace size approaches 0. None of the sampling methods tested here alters or mitigates this trend towards an
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overestimation of L1-similarity values. Were there an enduser who attempted trace sampling in conjunction with an
L1-similarity metric, that user could be led to believe, in
error, that the anonymized trace is more secure than it actually is.
Relationships in similarity between features are also distorted (or lost entirely) in every sampling method tested.
For example, the similarity of field src is slightly greater
than the similarity of field dst in our non-sampled trace,
but as the sample size decreases, this situation quickly reverses itself. Distortions such as this make developing an
effective sanitization strategy more difficult, as they can alter the perception of which fields are most insecure.
The results in Figure 3 are likely a result of the bias of the
sampling methods to select packets from larger “elephant”
flows and more prominent hosts in the trace – even selective
sampling fails to correct this bias; the resulting decreased
diversity in feature distributions would cause the similarity
values to increase. As sample size approaches zero, similarity values are much more varied and scattered – especially
when using flow-sampling methods. This variation is due to
the fact that as the sampled trace shrinks, the removal of
additional packets or flows could just as easily increase the
similarity (as the sample becomes relatively more homogeneous) or decrease it (if the sample becomes less saturated
with dominant “elephant”-sized flows).
Figure 4 shows the calculation of entropy anonymity degree using the same input traces and our similarity metric
from Figure 3 at its core. For all fields except srcprt (host
is based on an average of values including srcprt) the behavior of anonymity calculations is similar: as the sample
size (measured in distinct network hosts) shrinks, entropy
calculations remain at or slightly above the accurate value.
When the sample size decreases beneath approximately 800
distinct hosts, or about half the unsampled trace size, entropy begins to decrease across the board, with this decrease
accelerating as the sample size approaches zero.
Entropy decreases when fewer network hosts are present in
the sample because the distributions between unanonymized
and anonymized objects are more easily placed in a one-toone mapping than may have occurred in a larger sample set;
each sanitized object is more likely to have a unique distribution of features that can be matched with an equivalent
unsanitized object, whereas in a larger trace, there may be
several unanonymized objects with a similar distribution of
features.
These trends in entropy do not seem to apply to the srcprt
field, however, and the most likely reason is the large distortion in similarity values for this field. As seen in Figure 3,
the rate of increase in L1-similarity values on the srcprt feature as sample size shrinks is greater than that of any other
feature. This result is likely due to an increased diversity in
source port values relative to the other fields, a theory confirmed in this case by examining some typical deterministic
packet samples, with increasing values of n (Table 8).
While the number of distinct source IPs and destination
IPs shrinks by about a factor of 4 between these three samples, the distinct count of source ports decreases by a factor
of 14 – this indicates that the number of records associated
with each source port is small. As sample size decreases,
the feature is dominated by a few more common ports and
many lesser-used ports are quickly filtered out even at low
sampling rates. This in turn causes the L1-similarity mea-

7

1.800

L1-similarity

1.700

1.800
src

1.700

1.600

1.600

1.500

1.500

1.400

1.400

1.300

dst

1.300
1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200

0

1600 1400 1200 1000 800

Sample size (distinct hosts)

600

400

200

0

200

0

Sample size (distinct hosts)

1.800

1.800

1.700

L1-similarity

1.600

srcprt

1.700

dstprt

1.500
1.600

1.400
1.300

1.500

1.200
1.100

1.400

1.000
0.900

1.300
1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200

0

Sample size (distinct hosts)

1600 1400 1200 1000 800

600

400

Sample size (distinct hosts)

1.800

L1-similarity

1.700

host

Unsampled
Packet-deterministic
Packet-uniform-random
Packet-stratified-src
Packet-stratified-srcprt
Flow-deterministic
Flow-random
Flow-selective-1
Flow-smart

1.600
1.500
1.400
1.300
1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200

0

Sample size (distinct hosts)

Figure 3: Relationship between number of distinct hosts in a sampled trace and the corresponding L1similarity of each feature (including the host object). Note the different y-axis scale for the srcprt plot.
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Figure 4: Relationship between number of distinct hosts in a sampled trace and the corresponding EAD of
each feature (including the host object). Note the different y-axis scale for the srcprt plot.
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n
11
111
511

src
1163
566
219

dst
474
221
117

srcprt
7629
1718
538

dstprt
2708
1009
389

Table 8: Distinct values for each feature in deterministic packet samples.

surements for srcprt on the sample to increase and flatten
relative to each other, inaccurately increasing entropy at the
same time.
k-anonymity
The effects of sampling on k-anonymity are less clear, however, due to the fact that k for the sanitized trace is equal
to 1 on all fields. This is to be expected, as our sanitization
configuration did not involve the truncation of any data. By
not truncating data, we do not make any alterations to the
equivalence classes present in the unsanitized trace, and the
presence of just one quasi-identifier with one instance in the
dataset is enough to make k = 1 for the entire field.
The sole use of k-anonymity as a privacy metric is difficult,
however, due to the inability to identify sensitive attributes
with certainty. In our experiments, we attempted to judge
each field as sensitive, using the other three tested fields as
quasi-identifiers, as described in Section 4.3.1, with mixed
results. While an increase in k-anonymity in one of our
samples, such that k > 1, would indicate an inaccurate value
that could give a researcher a false sense of security, we did
not see this result in any of the sampled traces on any field.
Because k remains constant at 1 across all fields of all samples, we instead examined trends in the average size of equivalence class for each feature present in our sampled traces
(Figure 5). Class size drops rapidly and non-linearly as
the host count decreases, indicating that the largest equivalence classes quickly disappear from samples, as new smaller
equivalence classes are created, however, rather than destroyed by the sampling process; this causes k to remain
constant at 1. The type of feature appears to affect equivalence class size more than the distance feature count; equivalence set size for both fields src and dst decreases to approximately 10 at sample size 1250 and approximately 2.5 at
the smallest sample sizes, despite there being over twice as
many unique sources as destinations in the trace (Table 8).

Table 9: Snort alerts triggered by the unsampled
trace.
Frequency
Alert type
ICMP unreachable host
1
ICMP unreachable port
206
ICMP ping
285
TCP reset
1012
564
TCP window close
total
2068
utility (Section 3.2.1)
568.4
utility (without ICMP included) 371.6

4.4.2

4.4.3

Snort alerts

Investigation of the effects of sampling on intrusion and
anomaly detection was similarly difficult because of the tendency of sampling to reduce substantially the number of
alerts that Snort detects, which adversely affects the ability
to accurately predict the utility of the whole trace. A summary of the 2068 alerts triggered by the unsampled trace is
contained in Table 9.
Fully half of our sample traces (129 of 257) failed to trigger
any Snort alerts, while those that did trigger alerts only
triggered a small fraction of the utility total on its own; the
results are plotted in Figure 6. While the overall utility of
the sanitized trace was measured by Snort to be 568.4, this
figure includes ICMP packets that were filtered out in all of
the sampling processes – the sans-ICMP utility measure of
the unsampled anonymized trace was thus 371.6.
Only when using smart sampling, whose sample sizes all
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contained greater than 1200 unique hosts, were utility measurements somewhat reliable and followed a basic trend, decreasing sharply in a somewhat-linear fashion until reaching
the smallest smart sample (z = 9503, 1231 unique hosts,
utility = 0.46). When sample size shrinks further, alert generation becomes hit-or-miss regardless of sampling method –
because different random samples can behave differently at
the same parameter settings – with no sample registering a
utility of greater than 11.4 (which occurred with deterministic flow sampling, n = 211). Because of the unreliability (or
total lack) of alert counts, it is difficult to conclude that any
particular sampling method outperforms another. With the
possible exception of smart sampling, none of the sampling
methods tested would have allowed an accurate measurement of utility; all would have severely underestimated the
utility of the trace, as defined by our metric.

4.5

Experiment limitations

The tests and measurements that we performed were conducted on a single, relatively small (200MB) trace, which
precludes us from making broad-reaching conclusions about
the applicability of trace sampling to measure the privacyutility tradeoff in most circumstances or use cases. Because
only TCP and UDP headers were examined in our experiments, there may be other types of records or protocols that
are more amenable to sampling. Finally, our experiments
themselves may not provide a comprehensive summary of
sampling methods to measure privacy and utility, as we have
focused on a small number of distinct metrics and did not
test any adaptive sampling methods, which may or may not
outperform the conventional methods tested here.

5.

DISCUSSION

For the trace used in performing the above analyses, it is
apparent that none of the sampling methods tested would
have yielded accurate information about the privacy and
utility of the sanitized trace that could aid a researcher in
the task of releasing a network trace to the community. This
result does not rule out the ability of trace sampling to allow
an accurate estimation of the privacy-utility tradeoff, as the
trace used for these experiments was relatively small and
the sampling methods used here may differ in behavior on
larger or more diverse traces.
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Figure 5: Relationship between number of distinct hosts in the sample size and average quasi-identifier
equivalence class size per field. Note the different y-axis scales.
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Figure 6: Relationship between sample size (in distinct hosts) and the utility measured by Snort alerts.
But these results suggest that either additional research
into new sampling algorithms is needed, or that it may
be inappropriate to pursuit a one-size-fits-all approach to
sampling traces when measuring the privacy-utility tradeoff without a more intimate knowledge of the metrics being
used to measure that tradeoff.
Metrics relying on entropy, such as entropy anonymity degree, seemed more able to absorb the changes in successivelysmaller sampled traces and produce somewhat accurate measurements despite the noted changes in the L1-similarity
metric values that EAD was itself based on. Attempts to
distill EAD values for individual features down to a single
per-host privacy value could be misleading, however, as the
behavior of one field (srcprt) largely defines the EAD for
the entire host object in our experiments.
Because flow-based sampling did not definitively outperform packet-based sampling in any of our experiments, and
given its increased resource requirements, it would be difficult to recommend its use over packet-based sampling based
on these results. Were we to recommend a sampling strategy
for the trace tested in our experiments, a potential sampling
strategy to yield minor performance gains without significant loss of accuracy could include:
1. limited deterministic (sample rate ≈ 2) packet sampling to perform L1-similarity and EAD tests at a feature level, as they are the most performance-intense
metrics and least susceptible to disturbance by sampling,
2. measuring k-anonymity without sampling, as the results (while somewhat unhelpful in this case) are relatively easy to calculate and equivalence class sizes degrade quickly with even limited sampling, and
3. measuring utility using Snort without sampling, as any
sampling can seriously affect the number of alerts triggered (and thus the inferred utility).
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RELATED WORK AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Related work on packet sampling and its effects on network traffic characterization was conducted by Claffy et
al. [7] and Hernandez et al. [15], the latter introducing adaptive methods to equal or outperform non-adaptive packet
sampling while reducing hardware or storage requirements
to collect the relevant traces.
Brauckhoff et al. [2] specifically examined the impact of
packet sampling on flow statistics and the ability to detect
the Blaster worm by examining changes in entropy. Mai
et al. [23, 24] demonstrated the ability to detect a range of
anomalies using a number of packet and flow-sampling methods, and Androulidakis et al. [1] used flow-sampling methods
to specifically target anomalies dependent on changes in entropy across fields.
Kelly et al. [18] gathered a list of existing privacy metrics,
including metrics based on information entropy described
by Diaz et al. [11]. Coull et al. [8, 9] examined the sensitive
information that can be inferred from traces, methods to
measure privacy using a combination of entropy and L1similarity of feature distributions, and described an iterative
strategy to simulate an adversary’s attempt to deanonymize
data using externally available information.
Lakkaraju and Slagell [21] examined the use of Snort to
measure utility of a network trace. Research from Pang
et al. [25] and Slagell and Yurcik [30] discuss the inherent
tradeoff between privacy and utility when sanitizing network
traces. Finally, Fazio et al. [14] outlined a framework to
streamline the process of sanitizing traces for researchers
looking to best address this tradeoff.
To the best of our knowledge, however, there is no existing work that measures the effect of packet sampling (or flow
sampling) on the simultaneous measurement of privacy and
utility of a network trace, the so-called privacy-utility tradeoff. Additionally, this work treats trace sampling as one of
a series of steps to best utilize the resources of a researcher
seeking to anonymize and release a network trace with the
specific goal of allowing colleagues to conduct useful research
on the anonymized traces.
Future directions in work related to sampling and its effect
on measuring the privacy-utility tradeoff in network traces
include research towards more generally effective sampling
methods, and their specific effects on privacy and utility
metrics, and the ability to accurately “correct” measurements using sampled traces to their unsampled equivalents.
Finally, future research could also examine multi-stage sampling methods, or processes that combine one or more distinct sampling methods based on context, and their effects
on privacy and utility compared to using a single globallyapplicable sampling method.

7.

SUMMARY

In this paper, we examine several simple non-adaptive
sampling methods to discover their effects on measurement
of the privacy-utility tradeoff when sanitizing network traces
prior to their sharing or publication. The results will be
applied to the recently-introduced NetSANI framework for
trace sanitization that seeks to ease the burden on researchers
to adequately sanitize their network traces (while preserving useful data) and share them with their colleagues. While
packet and flow sampling have been used and analyzed in the

12

past for such applications as anomaly detection and traffic
measurement, little or no research has been done to sampling’s direct effect on measuring both privacy and utility
at the same time.
After sanitizing a small sample trace collected from the
Dartmouth College wireless network, we tested the relative
accuracy of a variety of previously-implemented packet and
flow-sampling methods when measuring privacy with microdata, similarity, and entropy-based metrics, and on utility
by use of the Snort intrusion-detection system. The results
of this analysis led us to conclude that, for the test trace, no
single sampling method we examined was able to accurately
measure privacy and utility, and that some sampling methods can produce grossly inaccurate estimates of those values.
We also found it unlikely that a single “universal” sampling
method could be used to perform this analysis accurately
on a trace of any size. We were unable to draw conclusions
on the use of packet versus flow sampling in these instances,
nor were we able to gauge the accuracy of these experiments
on larger traces.
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Figure 7: Relationship between sample size, in number of distinct hosts, and the measured L1-similarity on
the src field.
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Figure 8: Relationship between sample size, in number of distinct hosts, and the measured L1-similarity on
the dst field.
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Figure 9: Relationship between sample size, in number of distinct hosts, and the measured L1-similarity on
the srcprt field.
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Figure 10: Relationship between sample size, in number of distinct hosts, and the measured L1-similarity on
the dstprt field.
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Figure 11: Relationship between sample size, in number of distinct hosts, and the measured entropy
anonymity degree on the src field.
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Figure 12: Relationship between sample size, in number of distinct hosts, and the measured entropy
anonymity degree on the dst field.
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Figure 13: Relationship between sample size, in number of distinct hosts, and the measured entropy
anonymity degree on the srcprt field.
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Figure 14: Relationship between sample size, in number of distinct hosts, and the measured entropy
anonymity degree on the dstprt field.
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